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Occasional	errors	can	benefit	coordination	
	
[published in slightly revised version as a News & Views article in Nature 545, 18 
May 2017, 297-298, doi:	10.1038/545297a]  
	
	
The	chances	solving	a	problem	that	involves	coordination	between	people	
are	increased	by	introducing	robotic	players	that	sometimes	make	
mistakes.	This	finding	has	implications	for	real-world	coordination	
problems.	See	Letter	p.XXX	
	
Simon	Gächter		
Complex human societies exist because people cooperate with each other and 
coordinate their activities1. Cooperation involves collaborating for common benefit, 
whereas coordination requires people to match their collaborative activities in 
appropriate ways. This often entails solving small, local coordination problems to 
achieve global coordination. As an example, consider the production of complex 
goods, which involves coordinating the division of labour across sites. In this 
instance, error-prone people must solve many, often intricate, local problems such as 
work processes, or the logistics of production and supply chains, to achieve global 
coordination. On page XXX, Shirado and Christakis2 use network experiments to 
highlight the ways in which errors can help to improve global coordination.  
The authors set up 230 randomly generated networks, each with 20 nodes. They 
allocated each of 4,000 participants to a node, and asked them to solve a colour-
coordination game3, in which the aim is to make each node one of three colours that 
differs from the colour of every neighbouring node (Fig. 1).  
Players know that they are part of a large network, but see only the colours of their 
	 2	
neighbours. They can change their node’s colour as often as they like within five 
minutes. Thus, a player can remove local colour conflicts without solving all colour 
conflicts glob- ally. People are paid according to how long it takes to solve all colour 
conflicts in the net- work. This setup is an abstract representation of many real-world 
coordination problems3, in which the choices optimal for an individual might not 
solve a global coordination problem whose resolution is in the collective interest.  
In addition to human participants, Shirado and Christakis included three autonomous 
software agents called bots as players in many of the networks. They programmed the 
bots to play a locally optimal strategy, but to make a random colour choice a certain 
amount of the time. The authors tested three levels of randomness — 0% (no noise), 
10% (low noise) and 30% (high noise). They placed bots at different positions in 
different networks: in random, peripheral or central locations. Thus, they tested nine 
combinations of bot randomness and positioning to examine whether noisy bots help 
human players.  
Of 30 control networks that contained only human players, 67% solved their game 
within 5 minutes. The remaining groups became stuck in locally unresolvable colour 
conflicts. Placing low-noise bots in the centre of networks improved success rates: 
85% of such networks achieved global coordination within 5 minutes. The presence 
of these bots also increased the speed with which the problem was solved. 
Interestingly, the low-noise bots helped to resolve colour conflicts not only by 
deviating from the locally optimal action, but also because their behaviour nudged 
human players to occasionally deviate, too. The no-noise and high-noise bots were 
not that helpful, because they created less-than-ideal levels of deviation (not enough 
or too much, respectively). Bots placed in the centre of the network had more 
	 3	
influence than peripheral bots because they had more links to human neighbours.  
Shirado and Christakis suggest that noisy bots could be used as ‘simple artificial 
intelligence’ tools to help human decision-makers solve real-world coordination 
problems. But they could also serve as experimental tools, acting as models for 
human players who are, for whatever reason, occasionally willing to try something 
new or to disrupt the situation even if they do not fully understand what they are 
doing. Indeed, there was evidence that such individuals were present in the authors’ 
control experiments — some conflicts were resolved because players temporarily 
deviated from the local optimum. Thus, bots could be used to test how ‘disruptors’ 
can shift the behaviour of a population in coordination problems.  
Noisy play — making mistakes or experimenting with strategies — is also important 
for the evolution of social outcomes in models of cooperation and coordination based 
on evolutionary game theory4–7 (a theoretical framework in which strategic behaviours 
can be analysed in the context of evolutionary selection pressure). It is therefore 
instructive to compare Shirado and Christakis’s network-based problem with game-
theory-based approaches to the study of coordination, such as games in which some 
endpoints have greater rewards than others8–10.  
As a classic game-theoretic example, consider a game in which two players decide 
simultaneously whether to hunt a stag or a rabbit. Only if both go for the optimal 
choice, the stag, will they catch it; if one hunter chooses the stag and the other the 
rabbit, the first gets nothing, but the second gets a rabbit. In this type of game, 
attempting to coordinate to achieve a collectively optimal solution exposes players to 
the risk of a loss. Players might therefore opt for a collectively inefficient but safer 
endpoint, both choosing the rabbit.  
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Game-theory-based models in which players occasionally make mistakes predict an 
inefficient outcome for these games4,5. Experimental evidence confirms this 
prediction, particularly in large groups in which everyone must play the game with 
each other person11. But interestingly, efficient coordination can often be achieved if 
these games are played on large networks in which each person plays only with their 
neighbours. Here, success becomes more likely as the network becomes more 
centralized — that is, the more links players have to others12,13.  
This suggests a parallel to the current study, in which centralized bots improve global 
coordination. Thus, central players are crucial for success in both game theory and 
networked coordination problems. However, a key difference is that most game-
theoretic analyses focus on local interactions, whereas Shirado and Christakis focus 
on coordination success across the whole network.  
An interesting avenue for future research could therefore be to combine Shirado and 
Christakis’s network approach with incentives for both local and global coordination. 
This could provide a more-realistic model for interaction structures in many real-
world local–global coordination problems (such as in integrated supply chains or 
large organizations), in which people have local incentives for coordination. These 
incentives might make them unwilling to move away from a locally optimal decision 
to achieve global coordination, much like the hunters who have an incentive to go 
alone for the rabbit. The authors’ approach could be broadly applied to help determine 
the location and level of noise required to obtain the desired outcome in various 
networks, testing the effects of differences in both centrality and incentives for local 
and global coordination.  
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Figure	1	|	Noise	helps	resolve	coordination	problems.	a,	Shirado	and	Christakis2		set	up	
networks	of	nodes	of	three	colours,	such	as	in	this	simplified	example.	Nodes	were	assigned	
to	a	human	player,	or	sometimes	to	an	automated	software	agent	called	a	bot.	Players	
aimed	to	coordinate	such	that	each	node	was	a	different	colour	to	each	of	its	neighbours	
(colour	conflicts	are	indicated	by	red	lines).	b,	Players	could	only	see	the	colour	choices	of	
their	neighbours,	and	so	players	(such	as	the	one	starred)	could	remove	local	colour	conflicts	
without	solving	all	conflicts	globally.	Some	conflicts	were	locally	unsolvable	(such	as	that	of	
the	circled	player).	Bots	played	optimally	most	of	the	time,	but	were	programmed	to	make	
random	colour	choices	a	certain	percentage	of	the	time,	as	here,	introducing	noise	into	the	
network.	c,	This	noise	helped	resolve	colour	conflicts	—	in	this	instance	by	encouraging	a	
player	(triangle)	to	change	colour,	enabling	the	circled	player	to	resolve	their	conflict.	
				
